




















This paper provides new evidence on the relative effectiveness of formal 
monetary  institutions  in  achieving  price  stability.    The  institutions 
considered  are,  specifically,  central  bank  independence  (CBI),  inflation 
targeting  (IT),  currency  boards  (CB)  and  monetary  unions  (MU).    An 
empirical investigation is conducted to investigate their relative impacts on 
the average inflation performance, considering that often countries employ 
a combination of these institutional mechanisms.  The evidence indicates 
that both IT and CB regimes have been associated with significantly lower 
rates of inflation during the past two decades, whereas CBI and MU do not 
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  This  study  presents  empirical  investigation  of  the  performance  of  formal 
monetary institutions in the recent decades.  Though it is well known that the informal 
aspects of institutions may often be at least as important as the formal ones in arriving at 
the intended goals of those institutions, the paper deliberately focuses on the formal, or 
legal, aspects of institutional mechanisms with the intension of deriving policy advice 
regarding the adoption of monetary institutions.  Hence, the current study explores the 
relative  effectiveness  (from  the  standpoint  of  achieving  price  stability)  of  commonly 
employed  institutional  mechanisms  of  monetary  policy,  namely  legal  central  bank 
independence, inflation targeting, currency board and monetary unions.   
The breakdown of the (partial) gold standard, or the Bretton Woods system, in 
the 1970s, and the pursuant adoption of the flexible exchange rate system gave way to 
monetary policy independence in many countries.  This, combined with the oil shocks in 
the 1970s led many countries to experience huge inflation spirals and, hence, to seek for 
nominal  anchors  to  stabilize  prices.    In  face  of  the  rational-expectations  revolution, 
adoption  of  some  nominal  anchor  to  control  inflationary  expectations  became  an 
essential tool for achieving price stability.  Granting central banks independence from 
political pressures, inflation targeting and building institutional mechanisms of hard pegs, 
namely  currency  boards  and  currency  unions,  have  hence  been  ascribed  great 
importance to.   
Though  there  has  been  significant  improvements  with  regard  to  granting 
independence  to  central  banks  (see  Cukierman,  2007),  indices  of  central  bank 
independence (CBI) still show significant variation across countries in the 2000s.
2  The 
                                                 
2 See Arnone et al. (2007), for an update of CBI indices originally developed by Cukierman et al. 
(1992) and Grilli et al. (1991).  number of countries who adopted inflation targeting regime (IT) has also been rising, the 
number  reaching  to  about  40  countries  in  2008.
3    The  number  of  countries  that  are 
members of currency unions has also remarkably increased with the establishment of 
the European Union.   
While the success of all these institutional arrangements is likely to benefit from 
the lack of fiscal dominance and financial market development
4, the success of the hard 
peg mechanisms require even more stringent circumstances.  Specifically, the benefits 
of  currency  boards  (CB)  exceed  the  costs  of  losing  monetary  policy  independence 
usually when the country is small and it pegs its currency to the hard currency of the 
major trading partner.  For monetary unions (MU), an extended set of conditions that 
define  “optimal  currency  area”  are  viewed  essential  for  net  benefits  from  such 
arrangement  to  be  reaped  (Edwards,  2006).    It  should  also  be  noted,  that  several 
countries  have  adopted  a  combination  of  these  monetary  institutions;  specifically, 
currency  unions  and  independent  central  banks  have  usually  also  adopted  the  IT 
regime.       
In what follows, Section 2 presents the data and empirical analysis employed to 
explore the associations between CBI, CB, MU, IT, on the one hand, and inflation, on 
the other.  Section 3 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Data, Methodology and Empirical Evidence  
 
   
The Appendix reports the latest information available, to my best knowledge, on the CBI 
measures as well as the list of countries that currently employ IT, CB and MU.  CBI is an 
index that ranges between 0 and 1, and CB, MU and IT are all accounted for by dummy 
                                                 
3 See the Appendix.  
4 See Posen (1995) and Neyapti (2003). variables that take the value of 1 or 0.  The CBI data for 2003 have been made compiled 
by Arnone et al. (2007), based on the recent central bank laws, extending the original 
indexing methodologies of Cukierman et al. (1992) and Grilli et al. (1991).  The main 
sources  information  for  the  coverage  of  the  IT,  CB  and  MU  regimes  are  Petursson 
(2004) and Roger and Stone (2005), besides other IMF- and online resources.  Table 1 
shows that all of these monetary institutions, with the exception of CB, are positively 
correlated with the developed country dummy (DC).  In addition, the CBI index and the 
MU dummy show notable positive associations with the IT dummy.  
 
Table 1: Correlations among monetary institutions (CU, CB and IT are dummies) 








The data on CPI inflation (see Appendix) is obtained from World Development 
Indicators online, and is used in averages of 2000 to 2006, where the data is available.  
To avoid the estimation problems that may arise from the large variation in the inflation 
data, I follow Cukierman et al. (1992 and 2002) in constructing a transformed version of 
inflation: D=[Π/(1+Π)], which reduces the range of the inflation data to between 0 to 1.  
Since  the  data  on  institutions  considered  here  is  available  on  a  cross-section  basis, 
inflation rates (D) are also used in averages of the period 2000-2006, where available.  
The number of observations of the cross-section sample used in the following analysis is 
139, mainly constrained by availability of data on either inflation or CBI.
5   
                                                 
5 Angola, Belarus, Congo and Zimbabwe, which all had more than 100% inflation at least in one 
year during the 2000s, are excluded from the sample.  Among them, only Zimbabwe had very 
high inflation rate as of 2006; the regressions are run only without Zimbabwe, but the results 
remain virtually the same as with the exclusion of all four. 
  CBI  MU  CB  IT  DC 
CBI  1         
MCU  0.40  1       
CB  0.04  -0.08  1     
IT  0.44  0.52  -0.13  1   
DC  0.51  0.51  -0.11  0.75  1 Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, I investigate the impact of monetary 
institutions  on  inflation  using  a  simple  OLS  regression,  after  correcting  for  possible 
heterogeneity in the error terms using the White-heteroskedasticity method.  The basic 
regression estimated is as follows: 
 
Di = α + β1 MUi + β2 CBi + β3 CBIi + β4 ITi +εi   ;     i=1...139    (1) 
 
where α is the constant term, β i’s are the coefficient terms that are hypothesized to be 
negative, εi’s are the random error terms; and i is the country indicator.   
 
Table 2: Estimation results: 
Dependent Variable: D
Method: OLS with robusterrors
I II III IV V VI
Constant 5.84 5.54 6.74 5.82 5.51 6.23
(14.38)*** (15.39)*** (5.78)*** (14.29)*** (4.75)*** (5.12)***
MU -2.77 -1.24 -0.54
(-5.34)*** (-1.30) (-0.55)
CB -3.45 -4.27 -3.89
(-5.45)*** (-4.07)*** (-3.43)***
CBI -1.95 1.2 2.08
(-1.06) (0.98) (1.03)
IT -2.21 -2.89 -2.1
(-3.30)*** (-3.27)*** (-2.39)**




De.of Freedom: 164 164 137 164 134 132
R-bar-Squared 0.055 0.03 0.0005 0.038 0.09 0.13  
 Following the discussion in the Introduction on the higher likelihood of success of CB in 
small  countries,  the  regression  is  extended  also  to  control  for  a  dummy  variable  for 
small-countries  (S).    In  addition,  to  account  for  other  possible  omitted  variables,  a 
dummy for developed countries (DC) is added.  Table 2 reports these regression results, 
where the last column includes the extended version of Equation (1).   
Table 2 presents the regressions of inflation (D) first on each of the institutions 
separately in columns I to IV and then together, as suggested in Equation (1), in column 
V.  All of the estimation results reported in the table supports the hypothesis that each of 
the  monetary  institutions  considered  in  this  paper  are  associated  with  lower  inflation 
rates, on average, than countries that either lack these regimes or have low CBI.  This 
negative  association  remain  statistically  significant  only  for  the  IT  and  CB  regimes, 
however,  when  all  these  institutions  are  jointly  employed  to  explain  inflation.    The 
addition of the DC and S dummies, does not change this finding, though both S and DC 
are also found to have significant negative associations with inflation.   
Several  sensitivity  tests  are  performed:  When  the  regressions  are  repeated 
without excluding the countries with high inflation rate (listed in footnote 4) and with a 
dummy for Zimbabwe, then the R-bar-squared rises to 0.64 due to Zimbabwe’s outlier 
position, where the findings reported above remain virtually the same.  The regression 
model (Equation 1) is also expanded by using interactive terms, such as those between 
CB  and  S  and  between  CBI  and  IT;  these  interactive  variables  are  found  to  neither 
improve  the  fit  of  the  regression  nor  are  themselves  significant,  and  therefore  those 
results are not reported. 
   3.  Conclusion 
  This paper explores the role of monetary policy institutions in achieving 
price  stability  in  the 2000s.    Based  on  a  sample  of  139  countries,  the  cross-
sectional evidence indicates that countries that have adopted inflation targeting 
and  currency  board  regimes  have,  on  average,  achieved  significantly  lower 
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 Appendix: Inflation and Monetary Institutions 
 
 
D MU CB IT CBI S DC D MU CB IT CBI S DC D MU CB IT CBI S DC
(1) (1) (2)
Afghanistan 12.42 0 0 0 0.63 0 0 Germany 1.63 1 0 1 0.88 0 1 Niger 1.97 1 0 0 na 0 0
Albania 2.60 0 0 0 0.75 1 0 Ghana 16.49 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 Nigeria 11.03 0 0 0 0.44 0 0
Algeria 2.42 0 0 0 0.81 0 0 Gibraltar na 0 1 0 na 0 0 Northern Mariana Islands na 0 0 0 na 0 0
American Samoa na 0 0 0 na 1 0 Greece 3.18 1 0 1 0.81 0 1 Norway 1.83 0 0 1 0.75 1 1
Andorra na 0 0 0 na 1 0 Greenland na 0 0 0 na 1 0 Oman 1.52 0 0 0 0.31 1 0
Angola 49.39 0 0 0 0.31 0 0 Grenada 2.32 0 1 0 na 1 0 Pakistan 5.41 0 0 0 0.5 0 0
Antigua and Barbuda na 0 1 0 na 0 0 Guam na 0 0 0 na 1 0 Palau na 0 0 0 na 1 0
Argentina 8.16 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 Guatemala 6.52 0 0 0 0.63 0 0 Panama 1.57 0 1 0 0.38 1 0
Armenia 2.80 0 0 0 0.81 1 0 Guinea na 0 0 0 0.63 0 0 Papua New Guinea 6.83 0 0 0 0.63 0 0
Aruba 3.55 0 0 0 0.56 1 0 Guinea-Bissau 2.74 1 0 0 na 1 0 Paraguay 8.03 0 0 0 0.5 0 0
Australia 3.09 0 0 1 0.63 0 1 Guyana 5.94 0 0 0 0.5 1 0 Peru 2.11 0 0 1 0.69 0 0
Austria 1.98 1 0 1 0.94 0 1 Haiti 14.63 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 Philippines 4.74 0 0 1 0.63 0 0
Azerbaijan 6.07 0 0 0 0.63 0 0 Honduras 7.57 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 Poland 3.32 0 0 1 0.88 0 1
Bahamas, The 2.00 0 0 0 0.31 1 0 Hong Kong, China -0.82 0 1 0 0.38 0 0 Portugal 2.94 1 0 1 0.81 0 1
Bahrain 0.87 0 0 0 0.44 1 0 Hungary 6.00 0 0 1 0.94 0 1 Puerto Rico na 0 0 0 na 1 0
Bangladesh 5.36 0 0 0 0.19 0 0 Iceland 4.48 0 0 1 0.75 1 1 Qatar 5.53 0 0 0 0.19 1 0
Barbados 3.10 0 0 0 0.38 1 0 India 4.32 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 Romania 15.81 0 0 0 0.69 0 0
Belarus 30.10 0 0 0 0.44 0 0 Indonesia 8.04 0 0 0 0.69 0 0 Russian Federation 12.46 0 0 0 0.44 0 0
Belgium 2.05 1 0 1 0.94 0 1 Iran, Islamic Rep. 12.46 0 0 0 0.38 0 0 Rwanda 6.53 0 0 0 0.56 0 0
Belize 2.42 0 0 0 0.38 1 0 Iraq na 0 0 0 0.63 0 0 S. Cyprus 2.77 0 0 1 0.56 0 0
Benin 2.85 1 0 0 na 0 0 Ireland 3.85 1 0 1 0.81 1 1 Samoa 4.82 0 0 0 na 1 0
Bermuda na 0 1 0 0.44 1 0 Isle of Man na 0 0 0 na 1 0 San Marino na 0 0 0 na 1 0
Bhutan 3.70 0 0 0 0.31 1 0 Israel 1.50 0 0 1 0.38 0 0 Sao Tome and Principe na 0 0 0 0.31 1 0
Bolivia 3.99 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 Italy 2.27 1 0 1 0.81 0 1 Saudi Arabia 0.74 0 0 0 0.5 0 0
Bosnia & Herzegovina na 0 1 0 0.88 1 0 Jamaica 9.02 0 0 0 0.38 1 0 Senegal 1.98 1 0 0 na 0 0
Botswana 7.68 0 0 0 0.44 1 0 Japan -0.32 0 0 0 0.44 0 1 Serbia 23.13 0 0 0 na 0 0
Brazil 6.79 0 0 1 0.63 0 0 Jordan 2.96 0 0 0 0.38 0 0 Seychelles 3.08 0 0 0 0.25 1 0
Brunei Darussalam 0.33 0 1 0 na 1 0 Kazakhstan 7.79 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 Sierra Leone 6.22 0 0 0 0.56 0 0
Bulgaria 6.18 0 1 0 0.88 0 0 Kenya 8.43 0 0 0 0.44 0 0 Singapore 0.95 0 0 0 0.38 1 0
Burkina Faso 2.09 1 0 0 na 0 0 Kiribati na 0 0 0 na 1 0 Slovak Republic 5.74 1 0 1 0.63 0 1
Burundi 8.62 0 0 0 0.38 0 0 Korea, Dem. Rep. na 0 0 0 na 0 0 Slovenia 5.04 1 0 1 0.81 1 0
Cambodia 2.82 0 0 0 0.56 0 0 Korea, Rep. 2.87 0 0 1 0.56 0 1 Solomon Islands 7.75 0 0 0 0.38 1 0
Cameroon 2.12 1 0 0 na 0 0 Kuwait 2.39 0 0 0 0.31 1 0 Somalia na 0 0 0 na 0 0
Canada 2.26 0 0 1 0.63 0 1 Kyrgyz Republic 6.43 0 0 0 0.88 0 0 South Africa 5.05 0 0 1 0.25 0 0
Cape Verde 1.51 0 0 0 0.5 1 0 Lao PDR 9.91 0 0 0 0.38 0 0 Spain 3.13 1 0 1 0.88 0 1
Cayman Islands na 0 1 0 0.38 1 0 Latvia 4.72 0 0 0 1 1 0 Sri Lanka 9.76 0 0 0 0.56 0 0
Central African Rep. 2.33 1 0 0 na 1 0 Lebanon na 0 0 0 0.5 1 0 St. Helena na 0 1 0 na 0 0
Chad 2.59 1 0 0 na 0 0 Lesotho 6.92 0 0 0 0.44 1 0 St. Kitts and Nevis 2.04 0 1 0 na 1 0
Channel Islands na 0 0 0 na 1 0 Liberia na 0 0 0 0.5 1 0 St. Lucia 2.44 0 1 0 na 1 0
Chile 2.99 0 0 1 0.69 0 0 Libya -3.02 0 0 0 0.44 0 0 St. Vincent & the Grenadines 1.66 0 1 0 na 1 0
China 1.60 0 0 0 0.56 0 0 Liechtenstein na 0 0 0 na 1 0 Sudan 7.05 0 0 0 0.31 0 0
Colombia 6.03 0 0 1 0.5 0 0 Lithuania 1.82 0 1 0 0.81 1 0 Suriname 19.34 0 0 0 0.38 1 0
Comoros na 0 0 0 0.44 1 0 Luxembourg 2.40 1 0 1 0.94 1 1 Swaziland 6.79 1 0 0 na 1 0
Congo, Dem. Rep. 61.04 0 0 0 na 0 0 Macao, China 1.03 0 0 0 0.44 1 0 Sweden 1.45 0 0 1 0.94 0 1
Congo, Rep. 2.14 1 0 0 na 1 0 Macedonia, FYR 2.82 0 0 0 0.88 0 0 Switzerland 0.94 0 0 1 0.94 0 1
Costa Rica 9.89 0 0 0 0.69 1 0 Madagascar 9.81 1 0 0 0.63 0 0 Syrian Arab Republic 3.65 0 0 0 0.44 0 0
Cote d'Ivoire 2.78 1 0 0 na 0 0 Malawi 13.55 0 0 0 0.38 0 0 Tajikistan 12.99 0 0 0 0.81 0 0
Croatia 2.83 0 0 0 0.88 1 0 Malaysia 1.94 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 Tanzania 4.50 0 0 0 0.38 0 0
Cuba na 0 0 0 0.31 0 0 Maldives 5.14 0 0 0 0.38 1 0 Thailand 2.42 0 0 1 0.44 0 0
Czech Republic 2.52 0 0 1 0.88 0 1 Mali 1.78 1 0 0 na 0 0 Timor-Leste 4.90 0 0 0 0.69 1 0
Denmark 2.01 0 0 0 0.75 0 1 Malta 2.28 1 0 1 0.69 1 0 Togo 2.24 1 0 0 na 0 0
Djibouti na 0 1 0 na 1 0 Marshall Islands na 0 0 0 na 1 0 Tonga 8.18 0 0 0 0.31 1 0
Dominica 1.51 0 1 0 na 1 0 Mauritania 6.22 0 0 0 na 1 0 Trinidad and Tobago 5.20 0 0 0 0.44 1 0
Dominican Republic 12.91 0 0 0 0.56 0 0 Mauritius 5.64 0 0 0 0.5 1 0 Tunisia 2.87 0 0 0 0.69 0 0
Ecuador 17.07 0 0 0 0.94 0 0 Mayotte na 0 0 0 na 1 0 Turkey 21.54 0 0 1 0.81 0 0
Egypt, Arab Rep. 5.36 0 0 0 0.38 0 0 Mexico 4.95 0 0 1 0.69 0 1 Turkmenistan na 0 0 0 0.69 1 0
El Salvador 3.35 0 0 0 0.81 0 0 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. na 0 0 0 na 1 0 Uganda 4.38 0 0 0 0.56 0 0
Equatorial Guinea 6.16 1 0 0 na 1 0 Moldova 11.87 0 0 0 0.75 1 0 Ukraine 10.18 0 0 0 0.81 0 0
Eritrea na 0 0 0 0.5 1 0 Monaco na 0 0 0 0.75 1 0 United Arab Emirates na 0 0 0 0.44 1 0
Estonia 3.94 0 1 0 0.81 1 0 Mongolia 6.87 0 0 0 na 1 0 United Kingdom 2.74 0 0 1 0.69 0 1
Ethiopia 6.57 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 Montenegro na 0 0 0 na 1 0 United States 2.70 0 0 0 0.75 0 1
Faeroe Islands na 0 1 0 na 1 0 Morocco 1.76 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 Uruguay 8.14 0 0 0 0.63 1 0
Falkland Island na 0 1 0 na 0 0 Mozambique 10.43 0 0 0 0.44 0 0 Uzbekistan na 0 0 0 0.69 0 0
Fiji 2.77 0 0 0 0.38 1 0 Myanmar 18.67 0 0 0 0.38 0 0 Vanuatu 2.18 0 0 0 0.38 1 0
Finland 1.66 1 0 1 0.94 0 1 Namibia 4.83 1 0 0 0.38 1 0 Venezuela, RB 15.99 0 0 0 0.69 0 0
France 1.77 1 0 1 0.94 0 1 Nepal 4.44 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 Vietnam 4.38 0 0 0 0.44 0 0
French Polynesia na 0 0 0 na 1 0 Netherlands 2.17 1 0 1 0.88 0 1 Virgin Islands (U.S.) na 0 0 0 na 1 0
Gabon 1.24 1 0 0 na 1 0 Netherlands Antilles 2.59 0 0 0 0.44 1 0 West Bank and Gaza 3.33 0 0 0 na 1 0
Gambia, The 7.36 0 0 0 na 1 0 New Caledonia na 0 0 0 na 1 0 Yemen, Rep. 10.80 0 0 0 0.44 0 0
Georgia 6.04 0 0 0 0.75 1 0 New Zealand 2.52 0 0 1 0.44 1 1 Zambia 15.53 0 0 0 0.44 0 0
Nicaragua 7.32 0 0 0 0.56 0 Zimbabwe 97.10 0 0 0 0.44 0 0
(1)  Fund Surveillance Over Members of Currency Unions, IMF, December 21, 2005.
(2) Petursson (2004), Roger and Stone (2005)  